Country outlook · prepared 22 September 2026

Bhutan’s next decade is a jobs-and-diversification test

Economic momentum is real: hydropower commissioning, tourism recovery and public investment support a strong near-term cycle. But the country’s long-run success will be measured less by headline GDP than by whether it can convert clean energy, digital connectivity and Gelephu into productive private-sector jobs at home.

Scope: 2016–2026 evidence · 2026–2036 scenarios · nominal figures unless stated otherwise
7.1%
World Bank FY25/26 real GDP forecast
6.4%
World Bank FY26/27 real GDP forecast
118%
Public + guaranteed debt / GDP, FY24/25
19.1%
Average youth unemployment, 2024

Executive judgement

Base case: Bhutan grows at roughly 5–6% a year over 2026–2036, with a high-growth first half as hydropower capacity comes on stream, followed by normalisation. Living standards continue to improve, but employment pressure and outward migration remain the central political-economic risk unless tourism, agribusiness, digital services and GMC-linked investment scale materially.

The crucial distinction: hydropower can raise GDP and foreign-exchange earnings without absorbing many young workers. Bhutan therefore needs “job-rich diversification”, not diversification theatre: firms that export services, process food, build digital products, or bring visitors and investment into the country.

1. What the last decade says

A small economy with a large shock profile

Bhutan entered the period with rapid development gains but high external and hydropower-linked debt. COVID-19 then produced a sharp contraction, while the reopening cycle, Punatsangchhu-II and capital spending restored growth. The recovery is genuine, but the headline path is lumpy because a few large projects can move national GDP by several percentage points.

2020/21
-3.3%
2021/22
4.8%
2023/24
4.2%
2024/25
6.8%
2025/26
7.4%

Real GDP figures/forecasts: IMF 2025 Article IV staff report. Fiscal years run July–June.

The growth engine

  • Hydropower: Punatsangchhu-II began operations in December 2024; Punatsangchhu-I remains delayed, with completion risk.
  • Tourism: arrivals rose 41% and tourism receipts 35% in the IMF’s 2025 assessment, but the “high value, low volume” model limits mass employment.
  • India link: the rupee peg, electricity sales, trade, aid and hydropower finance make India the indispensable economic partner.
  • Crypto: lower crypto-mining-related imports helped the current account and reserves, but asset and repayment volatility remains a risk.

2. Demography and the census: the constraint is people, not just capital

2017 census baseline

The Population and Housing Census counted 727,145 people. It also documented fertility, mortality, education, labour-force participation, unemployment, migration and housing—important because Bhutan’s economic story is inseparable from its small and mobile workforce.

Population
727k
2024 youth unemployed
19.1%
2024 youth pop.
134k

Census: National Statistics Bureau; labour figures: 2024 Labour Force Survey / Ministry of Finance.

Why emigration matters

Bhutan has educated, English-capable young people who can access labour markets abroad. That is a household income opportunity through remittances, but a domestic growth problem when skills, founders and nurses leave faster than the economy creates attractive jobs.

The 2024 LFS counted 7,591 unemployed young people, equivalent to a 5.6% youth unemployment-to-population ratio; the Ministry of Finance reports an average youth unemployment rate of 19.1% using the labour-force denominator. These are different measures, not a contradiction.

Forecast implication: population growth should not be treated as a guaranteed dividend. The upside depends on retaining workers and raising productivity; the downside is a smaller tax base, ageing pressure and imported labour for projects that do not create local career ladders.

3. Fiscal and external position

IndicatorCurrent readingInterpretation
Public + publicly guaranteed debt118% of GDP in FY24/25High on paper; hydro debt is partly mitigated by India’s role as financier and buyer, but new commercial financing increases risk.
Current-account deficit17.4% of GDP in FY24/25Improving from 20.4%; still structurally large and dependent on project imports, grants, remittances and exports.
Gross reservesUS$1.1bn, 7.3 months of imports in Jan 2026A meaningful buffer, helped by lower crypto-mining imports, remittances and tourism/hydropower receipts.
Fiscal deficit2.6% of GDP in FY24/25Capital spending is rising under the 13th Five-Year Plan; spending quality and revenue mobilisation matter more than a single-year deficit.

World Bank Bhutan country update and IMF 2025 Article IV. Debt sustainability is assessed as moderate risk, not risk-free.

4. AI, digital infrastructure and data centres

Bhutan’s genuine advantage

Bhutan combines clean electricity ambitions, political stability, English-language skills, strong mobile coverage and a distinctive national brand. ITU’s 2024 ICT Development Index reports 85.6% of individuals using the internet, 99.6% of households with internet access at home, and 97% 4G/LTE population coverage.

That is a strong platform for digital public services, remote work, fintech, tourism technology, education and small AI-enabled firms.

Why “build a data centre” is not enough

AI compute is power-hungry, capital-intensive and internationally competitive. Bhutan still needs reliable transmission, fibre redundancy, cooling/water planning, cyber security, GPUs, specialist operators and a bankable tariff. Cheap clean power is an advantage, not a complete investment case.

GMC’s reported AI data-centre initiatives are promising pilots. They should be judged by local value added, skilled jobs, export revenue and grid opportunity cost—not by rack count or announcement size.

Most plausible AI pathway: Bhutan is more likely to win first in “AI applied to Bhutan” than in frontier-model training—language and cultural data, tourism, health, education, public administration, climate monitoring, financial services and outsourced knowledge work. A small, trusted sovereign compute and data-governance niche could be more valuable than trying to become a hyperscale cloud region.

5. 2026–2036 scenarios

Downside · 25%

Hydro-heavy stagnation

Projects slip, GMC fails to attract durable private capital, youth emigration continues and tourism remains niche. Growth averages 3–4%; debt and job pressure stay high.

Base · 55%

Managed transition

Hydropower and public investment deliver a strong 2026–29 cycle; services, tourism and digital firms grow but do not fully absorb the labour supply. Growth averages 5–6%.

Upside · 20%

Green digital hub

GMC becomes investable, AI infrastructure reaches commercial scale, tourism broadens without losing quality, and reforms crowd in private firms. Growth averages 7%+ for several years.

What would change the forecast?

Upgrade the outlookOn-time hydro delivery; transparent GMC governance; competitive power/fibre; vocational and tertiary training tied to employers; faster business formation; successful export-oriented digital firms.
Downgrade the outlookHydro cost overruns; commercially priced debt without matching cash flow; climate shocks; rupee/India weakness; crypto losses; continued youth outmigration; tourism restrictions that suppress demand without improving productivity.

6. Practical policy scoreboard

  1. Make jobs the KPI: publish annual targets for private-sector jobs, graduate retention, female employment and export services—not only GDP and megawatts.
  2. Ring-fence hydro windfalls: use dividends and export receipts to reduce vulnerability, fund human capital and crowd in firms rather than permanently expanding recurrent spending.
  3. Build the boring digital layer: redundant international connectivity, interoperable government data, privacy/cyber rules, cloud procurement and skills certification.
  4. Turn GMC into a testable proposition: phase it, disclose contingent liabilities, publish investor and employment metrics, and protect the rest of Bhutan from a single mega-project failure.
  5. Keep tourism high-value but deepen it: develop longer stays, wellness, trekking, culture, conferences and local supply chains so receipts reach rural households.

Bottom line

Bhutan is not facing an imminent macroeconomic collapse; it is facing a strategic allocation problem. The country has enough clean energy and institutional distinctiveness to create a compelling next chapter, but not enough people, capital or fiscal room to waste on prestige projects. Over the next decade, the winning model is a disciplined combination of hydropower cash flow, high-value tourism, productive agriculture and small-to-medium digital exports. AI can accelerate that model. It cannot substitute for it.